Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have become common in providing high-quality infrastructure in many countries worldwide. One of the main reasons for PPP agreements is to improve efficiency and quality in the delivery of public services, as well as to boost investments for expensive projects.
INTRODUCTION
Road accidents are among the main causes of death around the world. According to the World Health Organization (2015), more than 1.2 million people die every year on the roads, and for each person that dies there are at least 20 others that sustain nonfatal injuries, as a result of traffic crashes. Apart from the human suffering, the economic costs associated with these tragedies are high in terms of health spending, insurance costs, productivity losses and congestion costs. The last estimates of the European Commission (2010) calculate that 130 billion euros -approximately 2% of the GDP -are economic costs associated with road accidents. More recently, the International Road Assessment Program (2015) has found that the global economic cost of road deaths and serious injuries is about 1.8 trillion dollars per year in the world, an average of 3% of the GDP in each country.
There is a collective public interest in improving global road safety. Nonetheless, road transport remains as one of the most dangerous modes of transport. In 2015, in the European Union alone, the total number of fatalities from road accidents was 26,134, while from railways and airplanes the number of lives lost was just 27 and 150, respectively. 1 Improving road safety is linked to lower social and economic costs and more sustainable development. Therefore, multitudinous initiatives are currently being taken by transport authorities worldwide.
From 1990 to 2015 governments around the world have awarded more than 950 PPP road projects with a total amount of investment of 267,039 million dollars. 2 In many developed and developing countries, PPPs are an important and attractive alternative for financing and managing road highways (Engel et al., 2003; Bel and Foote, 2009; Albalate, 2014) . One of the most common strategies proposed by policy makers to reach better road safety outcomes has been to upgrade the quality of the roads. Nevertheless, public debt burden and fiscal stress have led governments to find ways of achieving better roads without compromising the state's accountability. The provision of better roads through public private partnership (PPP) has become almost normal practice to circumvent budgetary restrictions (Hammami et al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2017) . Thus, governments 3 find an ally in the private sector to meet the challenge of providing new and better road infrastructure.
Another important argument for the implementation of PPPs has been to increase economic efficiency (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; World Bank, 2012) . Given that the private sector is profitmaking, the lifecycle costs should be optimized. However, within the property rights theory of ownership based on incomplete contracting, it has been argued that although private management may improve productive performance it may harm the quality of services (Hart et al., 1997; Hart, 2003) , and indirectly, the safety outcomes of the service delivered. Supporters of private management claim that the private sector can provide public services more efficiently than governments, but critics claim that private companies will prioritize economic revenues over the quality and safety of services. Empirical evidence of the productive performance of road investment, as between PPPs and traditional procurement, is limited and findings show mixed results (Blanc-Brude et al., 2009; Raisbek et al., 2010; Chasey et al., 2012) .
However, other scholars argue that it is precisely the drive to improve the quality of services that brings about PPPs (Harris, 2004; Hodge and Greve, 2007) . According to the European Commission (2003) , the quality of services achieved under PPPs is better than traditional procurement due to the fact that the private sector introduces innovation in service delivery, promotes better integration of services, improves economies of scale and allows performance-based contracts. Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the relationship between quality and ownership or management models, particularly where road safety is concerned.
Indeed, an improved design and maintenance of roads would reduce accidents and provide users with more efficient mobility, comfort and lower vehicle operating costs (Burningham and Stankevich, 2005) . Moreover, some practitioners suggest that there are fewer accidents on private roads than public roads (Samuel and Poole, 2000; Sisiopiku et al., 2006; Block, 2009) , advocating for the road safety benefits of PPPs. Contrarily, others advise that private management can be more costly and might lead to problems with safety and quality (Kusnet, 2007) . However, the effects of management on quality measured in road safety outcomes have not yet been deeply analyzed.
5
build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT), design, build, finance and operate (DBOT), and rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT) (GAO, 1999; World Bank, 2012) . Fifthly, two types of infrastructure investment are available in PPP projects: greenfields and brownfields. Investing in a new infrastructure asset is considered as a greenfield project and investing in an existing asset at the operational phase is a brownfield project. Greenfield assets have high levels of business, construction and demand risks, while brownfield investments are perceived to be the lowest-return and lowest-risk sector of infrastructure investment (Bitsch et al., 2010) . Therefore, operational risk on brownfield projects should be smaller than in greenfield investment due to the asset having been working for some time.
Public-Private Partnerships and road safety outcomes
Although the empirical literature has not explored the direct impact of PPPs on road safety, we can identify two strands of related literature. On the one hand, research on the role of tolls in producing traffic shift onto alternative roads (re-routing effects). On the other hand, research exploring the influence of the introduction of performance-based incentives in road management contracts.
Re-routing effects and road safety Re-routing literature provides evidence that road accidents are higher on roads that are alternatives to tolled highways, due to the fact that charging for the use of the better road may encourage too many drivers to choose alternative free minor roads, which are generally of poorer quality or not prepared to receive high amounts of traffic. This literature is connected to our work in the sense that PPPs are generally associated with user payments via tolls, even though other PPP models may involve shadow tolls, which are not charged to users but to taxpayers. Publicly operated highways might also charge tolls to users, as is common in the United States and was common in some European countries such as France, Italy and Portugal before the privatization of their networks.
One of the earliest works is Lyles et al. (1990) . This study evaluates the crash frequency and crash rate of large trucks in Michigan. The most significant findings were that crash rates were five to 6 seven times higher on lowest class roadways than those on the controlled access system. Similarly, a recent study, also for the US, by Swan and Belzer (2013) , estimates the crash cost per vehicle mile traveled for trucks that diverted from the Ohio Turnpike to avoid paying tolls. Results show that crash costs are highest for the roads to which truck traffic was diverted.
In Europe we also find similar studies. analyzed the effects of motorway tolls on the number of accidents in the United Kingdom. Results show that a 10% diversion of motorway traffic from the toll motorways in Kent would increase the number of accidents in the entire county by about 3.5%. In this same line of research, Albalate (2011) tests whether charging for the use of highways might negatively affect road safety outcomes on the adjacent free roads. The author found that road accidents in Spain are higher on routes adjacent to toll motorways than those adjacent to free motorways, controlling for traffic and other potential determinants of road safety. And more recently, Baumgarten and Middelkamp (2015) analyzed the impact of the implementation of the German heavy good vehicle toll and the re-routing effects on road safety outcomes. Results of this study indicate that interurban toll charging causes traffic diversion, producing a negative impact on Germany's road safety outcomes.
Finally, at a national scale, we find the work by Albalate and Bel (2012) , which investigates the relationship between different types of road quality and their impact on national safety outcomes in Europe. Their findings suggest that, distinguishing between free and tolled motorways, the former were associated with a statistically significant reduction in traffic fatalities, probably as a consequence of the re-routing effect.
Public-private partnership and safety incentives in contracts Some theoretical approaches to PPPs hold that the introduction of performance-based incentives in road management contracts may contribute to improving road safety outcomes (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007) . However, empirical analyses of these effects are scarce and limited to few works. This literature is based on the assumption that many aspects of improving road safety, for example pavement maintenance and renewal, safety emergency assistance, safety equipment, etc., can be introduced into the contract through an incentive mechanism.
As far as we know, empirical studies on this incentive scheme in road contracts can only be found for the case of Spain. By using a dataset with public and private highways in a cross-section setting for the year 2006, Rangel et al. (2012) found that there are more fatalities, injuries and accidents on highways without road safety incentives than on highways with incentives. Also, Rangel et al. (2013) evaluated incentive schemes by using data only from private highways between 2007 and 2009, finding that road incentives are significant factors reducing the number of accidents and injuries but not decreasing the number of fatalities. More recently, Rangel and Vassallo (2015) expanded the previous dataset, including all types of highways -not only private but also public -confirming that there are more accidents on highways without incentives than those with incentives. 4 Some of these papers included a variable controlling for the road management model. However, it was not the main focus of their analyses (see Rangel et al., 2012 and Vassallo, 2015) .
These papers conclude that toll highways (privately managed) are safer than the second generation of public highways. However, in the case of Rangel et al. (2012) results indicated that the first generation of public highways, is safer than the second generation of public highways. This result was considered by the authors as an odd feature of their findings and, subsequently, it was reversed in Rangel and Vassallo (2015) .
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. Firstly, it differs from the previous research on re-routing by exploring the direct safety effect on the road managed by the private manager, and not on the adjacent alternative roads stressed by the diversion of traffic. Secondly, we provide a panel-data econometric estimation to explore the role of the management model on road safety outcomes, distinguishing by the quality of design of roads in a long panel-data fixed-effects model. Therefore, we separate the quality of road design into different tiers which allows us to make a more robust comparison between the private and public management models, avoiding the 8 bias produced by the different engineering qualities of the infrastructure. Thus, our results should not be influenced by the construction design.
THE SPANISH MIXED ROAD NETWORK
The highway network management in Spain is quite singular compared to most European countries. Spain has a long tradition of building and managing road highways through PPPs.
However, since the end of the 80s different types of management can be found (Bel and Fageda, 2005; Albalate et al., 2009; Albalate, 2014) . The first private highways were awarded in Spain at the end of the 60s. Having overcome the hardest years of the autarky, the Spanish economy was growing fast but transportation infrastructures were insufficient for productive activities. An expanded and modern highway network was required at a time when the public budget was insufficient to afford such investment. The government opted for private funding and by the second half of the 70s more than 1,800 km of private highways were already constructed.
In the early 80s, the democratic transition and the oil crisis increased the financial expenses and construction costs, bringing the private highway expansion work to a halt. However, a large number of kilometers of the Spanish network was single and dual carriageways and the growth of the highway network was still necessary 5 . The new government that took office in 1982 and remained until 1996 − politically opposed to continued expansion of the highway network with private participation − approved the first program of public highways 6 and started to build the first generation of publicly managed free highways. However, this first generation of free highways was constructed by doubling existing carriageways 7 . The three main reasons for doubling were economics (to take advantage of the existing road), traffic flow (private highways had not solved the traffic congestion on the adjacent roads), and safety (highways are safer) (Sánchez et al., 2007) .
5 See MOPU (1984) . 6 Within the Plan General de Carreteras 1984 Carreteras -1991 The first generation of publicly managed highways is the Spanish radials: A-1 Madrid-Burgos, A-2 MadridZaragoza, A-3 Madrid-Alicante, A-4 Madrid-Badajoz and A-6 Madrid-Benavente.
At the end of the 80s more than 2,000 km of first generation free highways were already constructed but the geometric design of the roads (road design) was inferior to that of private highways.
In 1993 the government terminated the first program of public highways although the expansion of the network continued to develop but without doubling the existing carriageways. In 1996 the government changed and interest in private financing of highways was renewed. From 1996 to 2006 more than 800 km of private highways were already awarded. Nevertheless, the government continued constructing public highways 8 . At the end of 2006 the Spanish highway network totaled around 9,700 km. Private operators managed 2,700 km and the public sector 7,000 km (2,000 km of which correspond to first generation public highways, and the remaining 5,000 km to the second generation).
Since 2006 to the present day, no more private construction has been commissioned. However, at the end of 2007, against the backdrop of an increase in the traffic flow, velocity and number of accidents on the first generation of public highways, there was a need to find a formula that made it possible for the government to finance the necessary actions 9 , and so 1,000 km of the first generation of public highways were transferred to private companies for a period of 19 years 10 .
Nowadays, 24% of the total highway network is managed by private companies and 76% by the public sector. However, the first generation of public highways − 50% managed by private operator and 50% by the public sector − has inferior geometric design than the private motorways and the second generation of public highways. Table 1 shows the length of the Spanish highway (RCE) by road operator and quality of the geometric design of roads. Of the 18% of highways that are classified as of low quality of construction, half are publicly managed (public_l) and the other half by private operators (private_l). These low-quality highways have the same road design characteristics because both belong to the first generation of public highways which were constructed by doubling existing conventional carriageways. That being said, low-quality private highways have undergone some conditional improvements since their privatization at the end of 2007. Nonetheless, they may never reach the benchmark high quality of design due to the initial geometrical design that cannot be substantially modified.
We choose to analyze the case of Spain because of the particular mixed model of management that allows for a comparison between private and public management models within the same national network. Thus, we are able to compare different forms of delivery with similar road designs. This allows us to better pinpoint the true effects of management on road safety performance.
METHODS AND DATA

Methodology
The most common methodology for modeling road accidents is based on count models because the nature of accident occurrence is random, discrete, non-negative and does not follow a normal (Gaussian) distribution. Different approaches have been applied to evaluating road safety determinants. Many different prediction models are available for estimating the number of accidents linked to a set of exogenous variables (see Lord and Mannering, 2010; Mannering and Bhat, 2014) . Given the characteristics of the outcome variables described above, count-data regression models based on a Poisson or on a negative binomial distribution are the most commonly used. 11 Nevertheless, a strong restriction of the Poisson model is that the mean and the variance have to be equal. This is the so-called equidispersion assumption. Unfortunately, this assumption is often violated when variance exceeds the mean, which indicates overdispersion in the data. It is when count data display overdispersion that the negative binomial regression model is more appropriate (Miaou and Lum, 1993; Hadi et al., 1995; Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000; Lord, 2006) . The negative binomial distribution allows for a more flexible modeling of the variance than the Poisson model and ensures the avoidance of biased standard errors and inefficient estimated coefficients.
Since the seminal paper of Hausman et al. (1984) , panel count models have been applied in road safety analysis in order to correct for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity. Poisson and negative binomial panel data have been used in both random effects and fixed effects alternatives (Noland, 2003; Chin and Quddud, 2003; Yaacob et al., 2011; Hosseinpour et al., 2014) . The random-effects model assumes that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. If this is the case, then the random-effects model is unbiased, consistent and more efficient than the fixed-effects model. If the unobserved individual heterogeneity is correlated with the exogenous variables, then the random-effects model will produce inconsistent estimates. In this 12 case the fixed-effects model, which always provides consistent estimates -but is less efficient than the random-effects model -is the most reliable choice.
Model choice
Our data on road accidents are collected in panel form (846 control stations followed for 5 years, from 2008 to 2012) and a simple pooled Poisson model is first employed as a benchmark model. In the Poisson model, the assumption of independent observations over individual control stations and across time is consistent with the strong assumption that the mean and the variance have to be equal. The Wald test and the Likelihood Ratio tests allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no overdispersion, thus we conduct a pooled negative binomial regression as a preferred model 12 . We assume that individual effects are independent across control stations for a given year but note that individual effects can be correlated over time for a given control station. For this reason, panel-data models should be more appropriate than pooled models. The Likelihood Ratio test is used to check whether the data are better modeled using a panel structure or a pooled estimator with constant overdispersion. Results corroborate the reasoning that a panel structure is more appropriate 13 .
As described above, in order to consider differences across control stations, two approaches can be used: random effects and fixed effects. In this study, both panel random-effects and fixed-effects negative binomial regression models have been applied and compared. Because we have some unobserved time invariant characteristics of the infrastructure variables such as lane widths, road curvature, and intersections that may violate the strict exogeneity assumption required for random effects, the recommended model used must be fixed effects. Notwithstanding the above, we conduct the Hausman test and results allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between the two models. This is the same as confirming the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors, which indicates that the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model is the only one ensuring consistent results.
12 The 2 statistic of the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value=0.000. The 2 statistic of the LR test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value=0.000. 13 The 2 statistic of the LR test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value=0.000.
13
In spite of the suitability of the fixed-effects negative binomial model there have been two different formulations. Firstly, the conditional estimation of fixed-effects negative binomial model developed by Hausman et al. (1984) . Secondly, the unconditional estimation of fixed-effects negative binomial model proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2007) . The main difference is that in the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model, the fixed effects enter the model through the dispersion parameter rather than the conditional mean function adopted by unconditional estimation. The conditional fixed-effects modeling implies that the time invariant variable can coexist with the effects, therefore time invariant variables are not dropped out from the model.
Because the main variable of interest in this study is management, which is time invariant, the appropriate estimator is the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model. In addition, using the conditional fixed-effects estimator, the incidental parameters problem (panel level heterogeneity) is avoided because the likelihood function is conditioned for each observed panel outcome by the sum of the counts for that panel. Once we eliminate the panel level heterogeneity, applying usual asymptotic theory with fixed time, and observations tending to infinity, the conditional fixed-effects estimator is consistent.
In order to obtain empirically the effects of management on road safety in the Spanish highway network, the following reduced form equation is estimated, employing the conditional two-way fixed-effects negative binomial model:
where the dependent variable is a count of accidents (acc_with) or victims (vic) in control station i and year t, is the constant term in the model. The main variable in the estimation is which identifies whether the highway is managed by the public administration or by a private manager. In a disaggregated model we substitute this variable with four other variables:
high-quality public highway (public_h), low-quality public highway (public_l), high-quality private highway (private_h) or low-quality private highway (private_l). Xit is the vector of road safety standard determinants, is the control station-specific fixed effect from which we obtain the locally specific road safety data and is the year-specific fixed effect. Finally, is the error term.
The subscripts i and t define the cross-section and the time dimension of our data, respectively.
In the equation the number of counts is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with E( ) = Ѳ and var( ) = (1 + Ѳ )Ѳ where = exp ( ′ ) and Ѳ = / . As previously defined, is the individual specific fixed effects and is the negative binomial overdispersion parameter which can vary across individual effects and can take any value.
Nevertheless, to estimate the parameters for the fixed-effects negative binomial model, the overdispersion parameter has been dropped out for conditional maximum likelihood. 14 Furthermore, we use the exposure variable ℎ because it is known that traffic flow varies from one control station to another and the total annual vehicles per km traveled could affect the count. 15 This means that the outcome variable needs a rate which is just a count per unit of vehicles/km traveled. The negative binomial manages exposure variables by using natural logarithms to change the outcome variable from a rate into a count. The exposure variable is entered in the log link function as the natural logarithm and it is required to have a fixed coefficient equal to one. The coefficient of one allows turning the count into a rate.
Data and variables
Data
This study draws on a dataset extracted from the Spanish traffic map database (Mapa de tráfico, The main variable of interest in this study is management (manage), however as we are interested in estimating the true effects of management, a quality categorization of the geometric design of roads has been conducted. Of the total highway network 24% is managed by private companies and the remaining 76% by the public sector. However, the geometric design of roads differs. The variable management is introduced in the model as a binary variable that identifies whether the road is managed by a private manager (value 1), or under public management (value 0). This variable, once it is disaggregated to deal with the different quality of design, is substituted by four binary variables.
The high-quality public highway (public_h), low-quality public highway (public_l), high-quality private highway (private_h) or low-quality private highway (private_l). All of these are dummy variables. Thus, we need to drop out one of them to avoid perfect collinearity, and coefficients must be interpreted with respect to the variable excluded from the model. All information on these variables is obtained from the 2012 traffic map database and from the 2012 Spanish toll highways annual report. Also, we take advantage of the research conducted by Sánchez et al. (2007) to identify the low-quality public highways. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables by operator and quality of the road design. There has been significant interest on the relation between road accidents and traffic conditions such as traffic flows (Martin, 2002; Lord et al., 2005a; Anastasopoulos and Mannering, 2009 ), traffic mix (Albalate, 2011; Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016) and speed of driving (Nilsson, 2004; Pei et al., 2012; Quddus, 2013) . On the one hand, most studies reveal a positive relationship between accidents and traffic flow and traffic mix (Wang et al., 2013) . However, other studies found that heavy vehicles do not seem to be associated with poorer road safety outcomes (Albalate, 2011; Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016) . Thus, our model will control the number of vehicles per km On the other hand, the impact of variation in speed on road safety has been widely investigated but results suggest that speed has heterogeneous effects on road safety (Wang et al., 2013; Imprialou et al., 2006) and no conclusive results are derived. Because we could not confirm this as a variable our model does not contribute to the debate on the role of speed.
Road design is another factor that needs to be taken into account when analyzing road safety.
Several researchers have focused on analyzing the relationship between accidents and a variety of different features of the infrastructure such as lane widths, number of traffic lanes, median shoulder, pavement, road curvature, intersections and signalization (Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000; Noland and Oh, 2004; Meuleners et al., 2008) . In general terms, results conclude that the road's characteristics have a statistically significant impact on safety (Albalate et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013) . Thus, improvements in road infrastructure have a positive effect in protecting users (Pérez, 2006; Gomes and Cardoso, 2012) . In order to control for infrastructure features we include the number of lanes and the type of road -depending on whether it is an urban road or interurban road. This is introduced by including the variable interurban, which is a dummy variable taking value 1 for control stations placed in interurban sections and 0 otherwise. This is the only physical feature that we can include because information on these aspects is very limited in the traffic map database.
Climate and weather conditions have also been important variables in analyses of road safety investigation. Most studies show that conditions such as rainfall affect accident outcomes (Eisenberg, 2004; Hermans et al., 2006; Caliendo et al., 2007) . For this reason we include in our equation of determinants the annual number of rainy days. The variable rainy is the annual average number of rainy days by province. Data were provided by the Spanish State Meteorological Agency.
It is widely known that individual driving behavior is a crucial determinant of road accidents.
Among others, alcohol consumption, speeding or non-use of seat belt cause more accidents and might increase their seriousness. Many analyses of the effectiveness of enforcement laws such us speed limits, legal limits of blood alcohol content and seat belt laws have been carried out in recent years (Loeb, 2001; Dee et al., 2005; Albalate, 2008) . Results suggest that the impact of laws and regulations may depend on the driving population under examination (Albalate et al., 2013) . We therefore include variables of demographic characteristics of the population as in the number of young people between 20-29 years old (pop_20a29) and the elderly population above 80 years old (pop_˃80). In addition, we include the number of liters of alcohol consumed per capita at home (alcohol_pc) to account for the risk of drunk driving.
We also include the GDP per capita in order to account for the importance of income as a determinant of road accidents.
Data for all of the socio-economic variables are desegregated by province except for the variable alcohol_pc, which is only available by autonomous community. The variable GDP_pc and the variables pop_20a29 and pop_˃80 were collected from the Spanish National Statistics Institute database. The variable alcohol_pc was obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Industry. As a result, our main equation is the following:
: is a dummy variable with value one for highways belonging to interurban environment and vale 1 for those placed in urban areas.
: is the number of lanes for each segment.
ℎ _ ℎ is the percentage of heavy vehicles from the total AADT by control station.
_ : is the annual GDP per capita at current prices by province.
ℎ _ : is the annual liters alcohol consumption per capita inside of home by regions.
_ ℎ : is the average vehicle fleet age by provinces.
_20 29 : is the total population driving age between 20 and 29 year old by province.
_˃80 : is the total population driving age older than 80 years old by provinces.
: is the annual average number of rainy days by province.
: is the control station fixed effects and
: is the year-specific fixed effect is the error term.
RESULTS
In this section we present the effects of management models on two road safety outcomes: the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic). We first estimate pooled count data in both Poisson and negative binomial models, after that we conduct panel negative binomial estimations with random effects and conditional fixed effects. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for the four models regressed for both dependent variables (acc_with and vic). A positive sign indicates an increase in the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic), whereas a negative sign indicates a decrease. Recall that our preferred model is the conditional fixed-effects model.
As we can see in Table 4 , the expected number of accidents and victims for the variable management (manage), is statistically significant and negative for all the models regressed. Private management is associated with a lower number of accidents and victims. However, this result could be biased if private management is more present in roads with high-quality design. Therefore, we disaggregate the management variable into three variables indicating the interaction between the 21 management model and the quality of the road. Results of this analysis are reported in Table 5 for the four models regressed and for both dependent variables (acc_with and vic). The results associated with the variables related to management and quality must be interpreted with respect to the category excluded, to avoid perfect collinearity. In our case, the benchmark variable excluded is public_h.
Results show that the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic) decrease when the quality of the road design is high. It means that highways with high-quality road design are safer than those with low quality design, as expected. Thus, it is clear that beyond the management model, the quality of design is a major determinant of road safety. As a consequence, any comparison must take into account the homogeneity of quality of design to evaluate differences caused by the management model. -37221.072 -13769.297 -13430.502 -9027.9368 -55640.509 -15553.963 -15342.747 -10443.27 Note: Time dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 When considering the coefficients associated with the highways of low-quality design (private_l and public_l), we observe that the expected number of victims (vic) is larger with respect to the lowquality public road, as expected. However, note that the coefficient of the privately managed lowquality road is substantially smaller than the coefficient associated with the low-quality publicly operated road, for the number of victims. Thus, we confirm that given the same quality of design,
PPPs have a better safety performance when measured in terms of casualties (injuries and deaths).
This result is not sustained when we measure the safety outcomes via the number of accidents with victims, given that the coefficients we obtain with the conditional fixed-effects model are roughly the same for the private and for the public low-quality roads.
Once we have described the effects of the core variable, we proceed to interpret the coefficients of the rest of the control variables. Relating to infrastructure characteristics, the number of accidents and victims decreases when the road highway is placed on the interurban environment (interurban).
However, the more lanes the road highway has (lanes), the more accidents and victims are found.
This effect is in line with Abdel-Aty and Radwan (2000) and Noland and Oh (2004) . A large percentage of heavy vehicles (heavy_vehi) is related to more accidents and victims. This result may be explained by the fact that even though the average speed drops with more presence of heavy vehicles, trucks slow down the flow and safe distances are less respected. In the case of sudden braking the collision probability increases and as trucks are heavier than domestic vehicles the probability of victims also increases. This effect is in line with Jovanis and Chang (1986) . The coefficient of the variable GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant in almost all the models reported. The number of accidents and victims increases in provinces with more GDP per capita suggesting that people who live in provinces that are richer are more risk prone because greater income is generally associated with more trips and movements. Accidents and victims decrease with the annual liters of alcohol consumption per capita inside the home (alcohol_pc).
This result is counterintuitive because it is expected that regions with greater alcohol consumption have more accidents. However, the coefficient of alcohol_pc is negative and statistically significant in all models regressed. This result may be related to the fact that the variable of alcohol consumption is specifically in the home. People who drink more inside the home may be more concerned about the dangers of alcohol impaired driving and may not take the same risks of drunk-driving.
Unfortunately, we were unable to introduce a variable capturing the alcohol consumption outside the home. The variable age_vehi shows an unstable behavior: in some models it is statistically significant and positive, while in other model regressions it is statistically significant and negative.
These results make it difficult to obtain clear conclusions, however there is significant evidence that the average age of vehicle fleets has some effect on road safety outcomes. The demographic 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we provide the first evidence of the role of road management models on road safety outcomes for a national highway network. After confirming that highways with high quality road design are safer than those with low quality road design, disregarding the management model and realizing that a true comparison between management models must consider homogeneous design quality, we found heterogeneous effects depending on whether the management of the road was private or public. Our results show that privately operated roads perform better in terms of road safety outcomes than publicly operated roads for the high-quality standard (road design) highways.
The annual number of accidents with victims and the annual number of victims on highways is 26 lower under Public-Private Partnerships. Results are also favorable for private operators on highways with low quality road design, but only in the case of the number of victims. The differences between road management models in low-quality roads is not statistically significant for the number of accidents, so we should be cautious about the implications of our results on the superiority of private management for this kind of road.
These findings are important in several ways. Firstly, in order to promote road safety the infrastructure should support high road design characteristics. The design and initial construction are crucial because once the road is built it is very costly and difficult to modify the geometrical design. Thus, our results indicate that beyond the road management model, the most important factor in determining road safety outcomes is the quality standard of the road infrastructure.
Secondly, for the same quality standard, we found that private highways show better road safety outcomes. It is necessary to understand the reasons behind this fact. That may feed an interesting line of future research. On the one hand, it may imply that private operators take actions or decisions that favor road safety, which may provide arguments for going private. On the other hand, public operators might learn from the better actions and performance of private operators in order to improve their outcomes, without going private. In any case, further research should focus on the management differences of private and public operators to better understand these safety implications. 
XREAP2007-13
